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Abstract 
Audmtors are a key feature of a company Theyperfor~n an importmt 
vole as they rAeport on a companykjkmcial a8airs. The report 
is presented at the comnpanyY general meeting for the beneJif of 
shareholders of the compmry who will consequently evaluate the 
performance of the companyk management Furthermore, the 
report is lodged at Companies Commission of Malaysia which e m  
be accessed by ~rariouspar~ties who wish to rely or? the report. Hence, 
ad to r s  hold apublic offl-e and auditors 'report is considered as a 
public document. In light of this, thispaper 6xplores thepossibility of 
attachmng af;?ucioly duty on auditors Ths  paper fhen proceeds to 
e m z n e  the manner courts deal wmth this concept. Thzs is importmt 
since the concqt is used extenszvely in relation to directors, company 
secretaries, receivers and liquidators. Nonetheless, in relation to 
auditors, it is uelutiiiely a new concept. This paper will also examine 
the challenge,,r faced by auditors with thia new concept. In 2007, 
essentially a new provision was lncorporafed in the Conzpmies Act 
1965 imposing a duty of good faith on audifors and to be absolved 
, fvm any civil or criminal liabilrty. Hence, thzs paper examines /he 
irnpiicalions of imposing such a duty on audifors. Interviews were 
carried out with auditors, academics, professional bodies, relevant 
bodies and ~-egulafoiy bodies to derive in-depth views on the subject 
matter Be that m it may, the duty to act in good faith is imposed on 
mostprofes-ssionals unddue to the fact t b  auditors ureprofessionals, 
the ZegisEafure imposed a similar duty on audifoi.~. The jidwiag 
duty imposed on auditors will brmg about more rights not only lo 
shareholder-s butother parties too. Thus, this lvill enhance the duties 
and obligation of auditors in the current coiporate atmosphere This 
is essential as there are an increasing number ofJinancia1 scandals 
which involve auditors Thus, inposition of ajiduciary dulyhrfher 
improves the reputatiorz of the audit profession. 
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Introduction 
This paper examines whether auditors owe a fiduciary duty to a 
company. The discussion then evaluates whether there is a fiduciary 
relationship between a company and its auditors. The paper then 
investigates whether such fiduciary relationship is imposed based on 
the mauner in the prov~siom of the Companies Act 1965 Ompanies 
Act), Banking and Financial Lnstitutiom Act 1989 (BAFIA) and 
Capital Market and Services Act 2007 (CMSA). The discussion 
also includes the results of interviews carried out with auditors, 
academics, regulators, professional bodies and relevant bodies to 
obtain their views on the concept of fiduciary relationship between a 
company and its auditors. 
Should Auditors Owe a Fiduciary Duty? 
a) The Views of the Courts in the United Kingdom 
In Hendemon v Merre~,~ the English court pointed out that auditors 
owe a fiduciary duty to the company. This is due to the nature of 
their duties and obligations. Nonetheless, the court pointed out that 
the fiduciary duty is parallel to contractual duty. This is questionable 
because fiduciary duty is not akin to contractual duty. Fiduciary duty 
demands a wider scope of auditors' duties and obligations compared 
to contractual duty. Furthermore, fiduciary duty expects a higher 
standard and degree of care on auditors to carry out their duties 
and obligations. Moreover, fiduciary duty covers a wider category 
of persons and bodies to whom the duty is owed. Fundamentally, 
fiduciary duty applies in situations where one party reposes trust and 
coniidence on the other party. 
Moreover, acontractual duty requires parties to acmtract to perform 
their duties and obligations based on the terms and conditions of the 
contract. The parties to the contract need to be concerned of only 
themselves and no one else. Hence, a contractual duty requires a 
narrower scope of obligations and performance from the parties. 
This is to be contrasted with fiduciary duty whereby auditors need 
to consider the interests of other parties who may rely on the report. 
Hence, it is submitted that the decision of Henderson v Me1-rep is 
wrong in law to treat fiduciary duty as synonynlous to contractual 
duty. However, the court in Henderson v Mzrr@P is correct in 
bolding that auditors are under a fiduciary duty wlilch is owed to 
the company. 
In Sayers v Clarke-Walker (a f in@ the plaintiff decided to buy 
shares in a p~ivate company froin the main sharel~olders. The 
defendant acted for the company and the main shareholders. Both 
the plaintiff and the main shareholders wanted the defendant to act 
for the plaintiff in relation to purchase ofslmes. After the purclrase 
of shares, the plaintiff suffered a lass since the purchase was not 
structured in a manner which benefits him in relation to taxation 
matters. The English Court ofAppeal found that the defendants are 
in breach of their fiduciary duty. The court stated that if the auditors 
are engaged by two different parries who may be in conflict, they are 
required to give competent advice as they are in afiduciary position. 
However, there are only two cases where the English courts found 
that auditors are under afiduciary duty which is owed tothe company. 
Nevertheless, there are views of the courts that auditors are under a 
fiduciary duty which is owed to the company. 
b) The Views of the Court in Malilpia 
As to the position in Malaysia, reference should be made to the case 
of Onestop Sofhiare Solutions Sdn Bhd v Marteritee Sdn Bl?d 
& 0rs6 where Rarnly Ali 1 made it clear that auditors are under a 
fiduciary duty not to disclose any matters which are confidential. 
This is because they are professionals. It should be noted that this 
is the first time the Malaysian court stated that auditors are under a 
fiduciary duty. 
Although the Malaysian court found t l a  auditors owe a fiduciary 
duty to the company, the legislations which govern auditors must 
be scrutinized to determine whether auditors owe afiduciary duty. 
c) The Position under the Companies Act 1965 
The duties and obligations unposed by the Companies Act, BAFIA 
and CMSA outline auditors' duties and obligation. Nonetheless, the 
legislations do not stipulate how the duties and obligations should be 
carried out ie. that the auditors must be honest. It is at this juncture 
that the concept of fiduciary duty is important as it requires auditors 
lo carry out their duties and obligations honestly. This is important 
especially in relation to auditors' duty to disclose the true state of 
company &airs to the extent that in some cases disclosures must 
be made to the Registrar, Bank Negara Malaysia BNM) and the 
Securities Co~nmission (SC) as required by S. 174(8) and (8A) of 
the Coinpanies Act, S. 40(13) and (15) of BAFIA and S. 128 of the 
CMSA. It should be noted that these provisions do not pres~ribe 
that auditors owe a fiduciary duty to a company. Nevertheless, the 
succeeding section shows a scrutiny of the provisions. 
S. 174(8) of the Companies Act provides that in carrying out auditing 
duties, if auditors discover that there is a breach of the Coinpanies 
A d  and it has not or will not be adequately dealt with by the report 
or the directors of the company, they are bound to report to the 
Registrar. This is a watchdog function of the auditors7 given that 
auditors are required to report to the regulators. It also shows that 
the auditors owe a fiduciary duty since they are required to report 
to the regulators. Althougli auditors are appointed by the company 
and required to report to the ineinbers of the company, by virtue of 
S. 174C8) of the Coinpanies Act, they are also required to report to 
regulators. Auditors must also consider persons othBr than members 
of the company. There is a wider category of persons, auditors 
should consider. Furthermore, this provision shows that audit is not 
merely an internal matter as it involves the regulators. Although, a 
contractual duty will not require auditors to do so, a fiduciary duty 
requires auditors to do so. 
However, it is a qualified duty as auditors are under sueh a duty 
only if the auditors discover a breach of the Companies Act or the 
auditors' report will not adequately cover the matter.s Nonetheless, 
' Hamahan, P, Ramsay. I, Stapledon, G, Aiman N d a n  and Ais11ah Bidin, 
Cvnrmerciaf App,lrcat~ons of Company Law Ln Mulaysra,(Singapo~~ CCH, 
2002). at361. 
it is a watchdog function as the provision requires auditors to review 
the steps taken by the Board of Directors in order to address the 
breach of the Companies Act. However, the predicament is the 
standard expected of auditors on this matter. This is because it is 
unclear whether it is based on what the auditors believe or whether 
the auditors could have reasonabIy discovered it. The provision reads 
"...if an auditor. ..is satisfied. .." Thus, the provision suggests that it 
is hased on what the auditor believes siuce it is worded subjeciively. 
Notably, the duty to report to the Registrar does not arise if the 
auditors do not consider that there is a breach or non-observance of 
the Companies Act. The provision does not prescribe any duty since 
the duty is determined by the auditors themselves. The provision 
should incorporate a duty based on objective standard whereby it 
should read "...where an auditor.. .ought to have known that there 
has been a breach ..." In that situation, an objective standard is 
imposed whereby the standard is hased on what reasonable and 
competent auditors would have known in the given circumstances 
111 that case, a fiduciary duty can be imposed on auditors hased on 
what reasonable auditors would h v e  done. 
Another issue which must be addressed is that the provision is 
criminal in nature because the penalty which can be imposed is 
a two years imprisonment or a fine of RM 30,000 or both. Thus, 
the issue is whether auditors should be satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt. Essentially, the degree 
of satisfaction should increase with the gravity of the imputation 
the auditors are making? Therefore it is submitted that the standard 
should be based on beyond reasonable doubt. 
Another provision which requirm scrutiny is S. 174(8A) of the 
Companies Act'O which provides that auditors of a public company 
are under a duty to report to the Registrar if the auditor is of the 
opinion that a serious offence involving fraud or dishonesty is being 
or has been committed against the company or the C o n p i e s  Act by 
officers of the company. It is to be noted that auditors' duty involves 
regulator as they rue required to report to the regulator. Thus, it can 
be argued that auditors under a fiduciary duty as they are required 
a Pound, G, "And~tors' Obligations': AusIraIian Accounfant 64(1) (1994). 50. 
' This provision has been inserted by Compames [Amendmetlt) Act 2007 CAct 
A1299) lu July 2007. 
to act in the interests of the regulators as they must discharge their 
duties responsibly. The spirit ofthis provision is similar to S. 174(8) 
of the Companies Act. 
A concern is that the duty is only imposed on auditors of a public 
company or a company which is controlled by a public company. 
Furthermore, 5. 174(8C)(a) of the Coinpanies Act provides that a 
company is : onsidered as bemg controlled by a pc5lic company ;f 
the public company has not less than 15% of voting shares in tlat 
company. There is no valid Legal justification to require auditors 
to report on fraud or dishonesty only on companies where the 
public coinpanies have 15% of voting shares. The public company 
may choose to hold 14% of voting shares to avoid this provision. 
Furthermore, it does not mean that there is no fraud or dishonesty in 
private company. Auditors of public company should be treated the 
same as auditors of private conlpany. 
The provision may be justified on the basis that in public companies, 
thepublic invested their moneyinthecompany andthnsregulators are 
required to protect their interests, However, it was reported in 2010 
that there is a trend in Malaysia whereby public companies convert 
to private companies in recent years." In fact, the shareholders of 
such companies are concerned of such attend as such privatizations 
affect the stock marketI2 as it wipes out RM46.3 billion. 
Moreover, the difficulty with this provision is the manner the auditors 
will form their opinion. The provision is worded subjectively ie.  
"...if the auditor is of the opinion ..." It is difficult to apply the 
provision in cases where the auditors are not of the opinion that 
there is any fraod or dishonesty. The provision should be drafted 
to read "the auditor is of the professional opinion that there is no 
fraud or dishonesty committed in the course of performance of their 
duties."In such a case, auditors are under a duty to detect fraud. 
Additionally, the provision does not impose a duty on the auditors 
to detect fraud. It only states that [Ell3 the auditor is of the opinion 
that there has been a fraud or dishonesty, he is under a duty to report 
I' Risen Jayaseelao,'%onoern on Privatizationn', The Stor: August 5,2010, B l  
" New Strmfs Times, "Pnvahsatlon Wipes Out RM46.3b From Stock Market". 
June 20,2007,37. 
l3 Eqliasis added. 
to the Registrar. Hence, tlie emphasis is placed on his duty to report 
fraud or dishonesty but not the duty to detect fraud. The provision 
should he amended to read that auditors are required to detect 
fraud o r  dishonesty. Notably, the duty of auditors to report to the 
Registrar in cases where there is fraud or dishonesty is inadequate as 
the Registrar does not represent the interests of the various parties 
who have an interest in the matter. Adtitionally, the Companies Act 
does not provide what the next course of action of the Registrar is 
with regards to the report. The provision does not providr tbat the 
Registrar will make the report public through any form of media 
for tlie knowledge of the various parties. Thus, the provision falls 
short of taking into account the interests of other parties except the 
regulators' interests. 
It should be noted that the teilns fraud and dishonesty are not 
specifically defined in the Companies Act. Nevertheless, S. 
174(8C) @) of the Companies Act provides that a serious offence 
involving fraud or dishonesty means an offence that is punishable by 
imprisonment for a tern1 that is not less than two years or the value 
of the assets derived or any loss suffered by the company, member 
or debenture-holder exceeds RM 250,000 and includes offences 
under S. 364, S. 364A, S. 366 and S. 368 of the Companies Act. 
Essentially, the offence involving fraud or dishonesiy must be an 
offence as provided for under the Companies Act. Furthermore the 
fact that the provision uses the term " ... includes ..." shows that S. 
174(8A) of 'the Companies Act is not confined to S. 364,s. 364A, 
S. 366 and S. 368 of the Companies Act. Thus, the concept of m e  
and fair view no longer acts as a yardstick for auditors to check the 
accounts of a company since there is a duty to report on fraud and 
dishonesty reposed on auditors. Observably, the duty to report fraud 
and dishonesty is of a higher duty compared to the duty to report 
on the company's accounts. This 1s because the duty to report fraud 
and dislionesty is result oriented whereas the duty to report on the 
company's accounts is process oriented. Thus, this again proves to 
show that auditors are under a fiduciary duty. 
Notably, the duty to detect fraud and dishonesty is only imposed 
on auditors in 2007 by virtue of the amendment to the Companies 
Act, wheress the duty was imposed on auditors in the banking 
sector in 1989.'"t took eighteen years for the legislature that 
the duty to report fraud or dishonesty should also be imposed on 
auditors in other sectors although such a duty is essential. Hence, 
corporate accounting does not do violence to the buth occasionally, 
and trivially, but comprehensively, systematically and universallyn 
annually and peren~~ially".'~ Fundamentally fraud can also distcrt a 
company's accounts. 
It sl~ould be pointed out thst the element of good faith is required 
for pr~moter,'~ director," company ~ecretary,'~ receiverlq and 
liquidator" through statutoiy provisions and case law. There are no 
statutory provisions which impose a duty of good faith on auditors 
from the time the Companies Act was enacted in 1965. Nonetheless, 
the legislature intended the concept to apply to auditors as can be 
seen in S. 174A(2A) of the Companies Act which was done in 2007. 
Similar words can also be seen in S. 128(2) and S. 320(2) of the 
CMSA which was enacted in 2007. This ineans that auditors are 
required to act honestly when they prepare auditors' report. This 
means that auditors are under a fiduciary duty wbich owed to the 
company. Hence, it is proposed that the duty of good faith is also 
included in BAFIA so that the approach of the Iegislmre is uniform 
towards all auditors in all sectors. Otherwise, auditors in the non- 
banking sector may claim that they are treated unfairly by the laws 
as they are under a fiduciary d i k e  auditors in the banking sectors. 
In addition to the cases decided by the English courts and the 
Malaysian courts, it can be argued that auditors are under afiduciary 
duty since auditors must avoid any conilict of interest. This can be 
seen in S. 9 of the Companies Act which stipulates the category 
of persons who are disqualified &om being appointed as auditors. 
The provision is drafted to ensure that officers and employees of a 
company are not eligible to he appointed as auditors. Furthennore, 
S. 174(1) of the Coinpanies Act requires auditors to report to the 
'* Tlus will be d2soussed n~the  succeeding section. 
'I Chambers, E J, "Accounting and Corporate Morality. The EEthal Criuge", 1 
dusirohan Jownd of Corporate Lmu No 1 (1991). 9 & 16. 
Erlmtger v New SombreroPhosphute Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 
l7 Re Smzth & FawceftLtd[1942] Ch 304 
Re Mo~vah Comols l in  Mimng Co. McKuyB Case (1875) 2 Ch D 1 
Chmna andSouth SeuBrtnkLtd v Em Soon Gzn [1990] 1 AC 536 
Re R GertzensicmLtd [I9571 Ch 115 
company at the general meeting. This means that auditors are 
required to report to the members of the compaly. The interests of 
the members are based on collective interests. Hence, anditors must 
not act fortheir own interests, the interests of the Board of Directors 
or the interests of the majority shareholders at the expense of their 
duty to audit 
If auditors offer non-audit senicos s a ffimpany, this amounts to 
a case of conflict of interest. This is because auditors wrn a higher 
income through non-audit services compared to audit fees. In 2001, 
Arthur Andersen earned US$55 million for non-audit s e ~ i c e s . ~ '  As
far as the banking sector is concerned, 70% of the fees that hanks 
pay to their auditors are for non-audit services?2 In 1993, 31% of 
the auditing industry's fees came from non-audit services." On 
average, for every dollar of audit fees, the companies paid $2.69 
for non-audit services?$ A study coilducted in Australia showed 
that 27 out 58 compmies of the top 100 Australian companies 
admit that ?.he auditors they engaged also offer non-audit 
In fact, it reached a point where audit and non-audii services are 
indistingnishable." It was reported that in the year 2000, the 'Big 
Four' andit finnsn earn 50% of their income from management and 
consultancy which was only 13% in 1981." There is also evidence 
that revenue from other services has increased.19 The Ethics 
Standards Board which is part of the UK accountancy regulator 
Brown, R E, Tmn/Ande~sen. Cnsis in U.S Accounting and Lessons for 
Government", Pubilc BudgetingandF~nonce 25(3) (2005): 20 
Econonzist, "AM& Sort of Pond Life': 7 June 20Oz 70. 
21 Bymnes, N, Brady, D, Lavelle, L andpalmeri, C, "Acconnting Cns~s", Rzarness 
Week, 2002 
2"Baiy, K, Bylinski, J and Shields, M, "Efkcts of Audit Report Wo~dnx 
Changes on the Perceived Message f o u r ~ a l  of Accounfmg Researclz 21(2) 
(1983): 355-370 
" Watts, T, "Non-Audit Fees Survey: A Review of Ule Nan-Audit Services 
Perfnmed by the Auditors of the ASX Top 100 from 1992-2002, InrilluNonnl 
Anal+wsls Melboumne, November 2002, 19, 
z V ~ p e s e n ,  K K, "Remventing Audrting, Redefiniug Consultmg and 
28 Secuilie~ anl ~ x o h i n ~ e s  Commiss~on of the-united States of America, 
Prayosed Rde. Revirron of t11e SEC Conimrssronk Auditor Independerne 
Requrmenfs, (Washington D.C. SEX, June 2000). 
" Palnuose, Z ''Audit Fees and Auditor Size. Furlher Evifieuce": Joumd of 
Aecountzng Re~ear.ch 24(1) (1986): 97-110 
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is of the opinion that auditors siiould not provide audit and non- 
audit services to the same client.30 The management of the company 
prefers to engage the auditors for non-audit servi~es because of 
the comfortable personal relationship wit11 the auditors." Auditors 
usually offer non-audit services to the co~npany wl5el~ they audit. If 
auditors are stjlct in carrying out their duties and obligations, there 
is a possibility thak they lose their conbacts for nou-audit services. 
Additionally, auditors shall not divulge any confidential informaticil 
to any person except as required by the Colnpanies Act, BAFIA and 
CMSA. 
Thus, the provisions of the Companies Act do point towards the 
aryunent that auditors are under a fiduciary duty. Furthermore, 
considering the importance of auditors in the current corporate 
atmosphere and the impact if auditors'report turns out to be untrue, 
auditors owe a fiduciary duty. 
The succeeding section will examine whether a fiduciary duty can 
be argued on the basis of tlie provisions of BAFIA. 
d) ThePosition under the Banking and Financial Institntions 
Act 1989 
S. 40(13) of the BAFIA provides that BNM may at any time 
require an auditor to submit such additional information as BNM 
may specify; enlarge or extend the scope of his audit as BNM 
may specify; carry out any specific examination or establish any 
procednre in any paticular case or submit a report on any of the 
matter above. BNM may specify the time witliin whicb the above 
is required. The provision shows that auditors do not only owe a 
duty to the financial institution but BNM too. This is because BNM 
has a right to involve itself in the financial institution's affairs. It 
also sliows that in the event the duties and obligations under the 
Compnies Act aye insufficient, the duties and obligations under 
BAFlA could he extended by BNM. Furthermore, the applicable 
30 Parker, A, "Accountm~ts Attack P h  to Restrict Auditors' Role", Frila~zcial 
limes, October 12,2002,2. 
" Joseph, C V, Hermanson. R H and McGmtl~, N T "Audit @allty Attnhutes: 
The Peroeptions of Audit Partners, Prepares and Fimclal Statenlent Users", 
Audcting. A J w m l  o,fP~Prctrce andTheory ll(1) (1992): 1-15. 
accounting standards are not exhaustive as BNMmay impose some 
other procedure to be adopted by the auditors. This provision shows 
that auditors are under a fiduciary duty as they also owe a duty to 
BNM which is not a party to the contract. 
Moreover, S. 40(15)(a) of the BAFIA provides that auditors of 
banks and financial institutions are under a duty to report to BNM 
if there is any contravention of BAFLA or any offence which relates 
to dishonesty or fraud under any other law.32 This means that the 
applicationof S. 40(15) oftheBAFIAis wider than S. 174(8A) of the 
Companies Act since the latter is confined to fraud and dishonesty 
where as the former includes any offence under any other law. 
Nonetheless, the concern is whether BNM represents the interests 
of the stakeholders since auditors are required to report to BNM?3 
Additionally, the provision is unclear as to what the next course of 
action on the part of BNM is after receiving the report. 
S. 40(15)(b) of the BAFIA provides that an auditor shall report to 
BNM if losses have been incurred by the financial institution whkh 
reduce its capital funds to an extent that it is no longer able to comply 
withthe specifications ofBNM. By virtue of S. 40(15)(c), theauditor 
shall report to BNM if these is any irregularity which jeopardies the 
interests of depositors or creditors ofthe financial institution. Finally 
under S. 40(15)(d), he must report if he is unable to confirm that 
the claims of depositors or creditors are covered by the assets of 
the financial institution. The provisions show that the auditors lnust 
consider the interests of the creditors. Such a requirement is not 
found in the Companies Act although there are creditors involved 
non-financial companies. 
j' Reference should be made to the Indian legal position as can be seen in the case 
of Deputy Seeretaw v. S N  Das Gupta (1955) 15 Corn Cas 413 wfierehy an 
auditor oSa bankrne comvany failed ta verify the cash balauce claimed by (he 
- 
managerncnt and the atd oasl~ 1n land tunled out to be much less than was 
shorn In the books Hence, the auditor failed to detect fraud although he was 
required to do so by virtueof the banking leglslatkon m Indla 
" L o g a n a h  Knshnan, "The Role of Auditors in the. Banking Sector': paper 
presented at the Applzed Infernahanal Business Conferem@, Unzve~sztl 
Mol4J,sw Sabah, November B8* ,  2008 
Thus, it can be seen that auditors have to consider the interests of 
regulators, creditors, Investors and depositors. This shows that there 
is a wider category of persons auditors must cousidet Auditors 
cannot only consider the interests of the company it audits. Thus, its 
submitted that based onthe provisions of BAFIA, auditors are under 
a fiduciary duDj. 
e) The Position under the Capita1 Market and Services Act 
2007 
The CMSAtookeffect on lstDecemberZOO7. The Securitieshdustry 
A d  1983 and the Futures Industry Act 1993 which formerly governed 
the regulations for securities and htures industry in Malaysia were 
merged and fonned pait of the new CMSA. The intention is to have 
a single Act which is effective and market-oriented. Apart from this 
two Acts, a few provisions in the Securities Cominission Act 1993 
were also consolidated into the CMSA. CMSAis significant in tenns 
of its new provisions to strengthen investor pr~tection.~' 
In view of that, focus is centered on the provisions which govern 
auditors. The duties of auditors are provided in S. 128(1) of the 
CMSA. The provision reads that if an auditor becomes aware of any 
matter which in his opinion may constitute a breach of this Act; of 
any irregularity that may have a material effect on the company's 
accounts including any irregularity that jeopardizes the funds or 
property of the clients oftlle company; that losses have been incurred 
by tlte company that it is unable to meet the minimum financial 
requirements as prescribed by the Act; he is unable to confirm that 
the claims of clients or creditors of the company are covered by 
the assets of the company; that an offence in com~ection with the 
business of the relevant person has been committed; or in the case of 
public listed company there has been acontravention of the rules of 
a stock exchange, the auditor shall immediately report the matter to 
the stock exchange and SC. 
l4 A d  Laili Ycon, '"The CapiM Markets and Services Act 2007: Is ~ 
a ReTonnaflon in ihe Law of Securities wd Futures Industry UI Mal~ysk7'' 
paper presented at the lnfeinatcoml Conference on Corporafe Law: 
Contemporary Roles and Cholhngns, Univer,saas Airlangga Su?,abqya, June 
Is - 3m, 2009. 
The provision shows that it is the auditors' duty to wbistle-bl0w3~ 
in the secondary market36 The provision uses a very general word 
i e. offence as opposed to fraud or dishonesty in S. 174(8A) of the 
Companies Act and S. 40(15) BAFfA. This means that the duty of 
auditors to whistle-blow is not only confined to fraud and dishonesty 
but to any offence under any law. Hence, the duties and obligations 
of auditors under CMSA are very wide. It can he obsewed that the 
intention of the legislature is to impose h i i r  standards on auditors 
from the existence of the Companies Act in 1965 to the introduction 
of CMSA in 2007. 
S. 128(3) of the CMSAprovides that the SC may at any time require 
the auditor to submit such additional information; extend the scope 
of his audit; carry out any specsc examination or establish any 
procedure in any particular case; to submit a report on any of the 
matter referred above; or submit an interim report on any of the 
matters above. A similar provision 1s found in S. 320(3) of the 
CMSA. The provisions were invoked in respect of Comsa Farms 
Bhd wl~erehy the SC askedthe auditors, MooresRowland to do extra 
verification work and provide more information on the company's 
draft audited accounts for the year 2005.37 Tile auditors have to eany 
out the additional duties. It can he seen that this provisionis similar 
to S.  40 of BAFLA. 
Another provision which requires attention is S. 320 of the CMSA 
which only applies to public listed companies. The provision 
provides that if an auditor is of the professional opinionthat there bas 
been a breach or non-performance of any requirement or provision 
of the securities laws, a breach of any of the rules of the stock 
exchange or any matter which may adversely affect to a material 
extent the financial position of the listed corporation, the auditor 
shall immediately submit a written report on the matter in the case 
" Logmathan %!.sluran, "'A Legal S m t m y  on the Itole of Auditors in Whrstle- 
B1owiog';paperpresenMatthe Tvan~J~'afwLmi?llConfemmce-Iniernahonal 
Conference on Coryorate Goverrmce and Corporate Responrdibl~~, K w i a  
L&~w, October 19th - 20m, 2010. 
" S11anti Geoffrey, "The C M S A  Ensuring ~okeepeis'Acoount&~Iility", paper 
presented at the Corporate Law and Oovcmnncce Semmar. Company Law 
Development m Unrled Krngdom and the Fmoanczal CFZSIS -Irnpi~catrons For 
A4a?aysra, Kmla Lumpur, 211July 2010. 
Busmess Times, "SCAsks ComsaAuditm ForMore Info", November 25,2005 
of a breach or non-performance of any requirement or provision 
of the securities laws, to the Commission; in the case of a breach 
or non-performance of any of the rules of a stock exchange, to the 
relevant stock exchange and the Commission; or in any other case 
which adversely affects to a material extent the financial position 
of the listed corporation, to the relevant stock exchange and the 
Commission. This is also a duty to whistle-blow by the auditors.38 
It should be noted that the duties are akin to those duties unposed 
under S. 128 of the CMSA and BAFIA except that the regulators are 
different. This meansthat auditors of afinancial institution or apnblic 
company regardless of whether it is listed are bound by the duties as 
specified under BAFIA and CMSArespectively. This is in addition 
to those duties imposed under the Companies Act. Nonetheless, 
upon close scrutiny of S. 320 of the CMSA, the provision uses the 
term "...professional opinion.. ." Such a provision is not found in 
the Companies Act, BAFIA or the other provisions of the CMSA 
regarding auditors' duties, It can be seen that the legislature is awase 
on the importance of auditor's opinion. The legislature recognizes 
the fact that auditors form professional opinion. At the same time 
auditors will have to bear in mind that their opinion is important for 
the various parties and the duty should not be taken lightly. Thus, 
it can be argued that auditors owe a fiduciary duty to the colnpany 
based on the provisions of CMSA. 
f )  The Position under Contracts Act 1950 
In addition to audit, auditors may offer non-audit services to a 
company. In cases where the Board of Directors or the management 
of the winpany is presmred by auditors to award the contract to 
offer non-audit services to the auditors, the issue is whether there is 
free consent by the company. 
This is because S.  lO(1) of the Contracts Act 1950 (CAI provides 
that all agreelnents are contracts if they are made by free consent. 
S. 13 of the CA 1950 provides that two or more persons are said to 
Hazlma Shaik Noor Alm, "Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Ac- 
eidentalhlties or Lifetime Panners?" paper presented at the Internalional Con- 
f ~ m e  on Corprufe Law Conternpor~~ry Roles and ChaII~ge3, Unlversltas 
A~rLangga Swabayo. June I" - 352009. 
consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. 
S. 14(b) of the CA 1950 provides that consent is said to be free 
wben it is not caused by undue intluence. S. 16(1) of the CA 1950 
reads that a contract is said to be induced by undue influence where 
the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the 
parties is in a position to dominate .the will of the other and uses that 
pos'tion to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to 
&t&n an unfair advantage over the other. 3. 16(2) of ?he CA 1950 
provides that a person k deemed to be  in a position to dominate the 
will of another where he holds areal or apparent authority over the 
other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other. 
Arguably, auditors are in a position to dominate the will of the 
company since they are in afiduciaty relationship with the company. 
They may use their position to inAuence the Board of Directors or 
the management of the company to award the contract to offer non- 
audit services to them. The unfair advantage obtained by them is that 
the company does not have a choice to offer non-audit services to 
another person, firm or company. 
Therefore, auditors are in a position to dominate the will of the 
company. According to S. 16(3) of the CA, where a person who is 
in a position to dominate the will of another, enters into a contract 
with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the 
evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that 
the contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the 
person in aposition to dommate the will of the other. Therefore, the 
burden is on the auditors to prove that there is no domination of the 
will of the compmy. 
It should be pointed out that there are no cases on this point where 
undue influence was raised against the auditors with regards to the 
offer of non-audit services. However, the point is atguable since 
there are elements of dmination, influence and unfair advantage. In 
the event, undue influence can be established the contract for non- 
audit services is voidable. A voidable contract is interpreted in S. 
2(i) of the CA 1950 as an agreement which is enforceable by law at 
the option of one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the option 
of the other or others. Thus, the option is available to the company 
against the auditors. 
S. 20 of the CA 1950 provides that when consent to an agreement 
is caused by undue intluence, the agreement is a contract voidable 
at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. Any sueh 
contract inay be set aside absolutely or, if the party who was entitled 
to avoid it has received any benefit there under, upon such tenns 
and conditions as the court may seem just. Thus, if the auditors 
provided the non-audit services, the company is not able to rescind 
the contract but will have to pay BrZ1:e servises. Ifthe auditors have 
not provided the non-audit services, the coinpany is able to rescind 
the contract. 
In relation to the issue of non-audit services, it is difficult for the 
coinpany to prove there is undue influence by the auditors, in order 
to rescind the contract. Tl~us, it is proposed that auditors should nof 
be allowed to offer non-audit services to the company. 
Research Methodology 
The research methodology used in this study is library research 
and also survey by interviews. Interviews refer to a form of direct 
communication between the interviewer and the respondent in 
a ke-to-face This is a flexible method and has a two- 
way method of communication whereby the interviewer can ask 
questions during the interview."@Additionally, there is instant 
feedback which can give room to more questians, detail information 
and visual demonstration. The interviewer also has a control over the 
discussion and is able to cater to any unique sitnations if they arise. 
The type of interview conducted is a respondent interview type. The 
interviewer directs the interview and the interviewee responds to the 
questions of the re~earcher.~' The interviews conducted are in-depth 
in order to find out what is the current situation" 
The interviews were conducted on auditors, academics, regulators, 
professional bodies and interested bodies. The categories of 
respondents are as follows: 
" Kabn, R aod Cameell, C, TFa Dynamics of Inferviewmng. (New York and 
Chiel~esier: Wiley, 1953 
*O Saunders, M, Lewis, P and Thornhill, 4 Resea%lz MctIso& for Bvsinm 
Strulents, @&ubw: Preuhce Hatl, 2007). 
*' Easterby-Smith, I& Those, R and hwe ,  A, Manoge~nent Research An 
I,Woduchon, 2" ed.. (Londo~~: Sage, 2002). 
" Robson, C, Reol UiorldResearch, 2'd ed., (Oxford. Blackwell, 2002). 
Table 1 
Persons and bodies iaterviewed 
NO PERSONStBODIES INTEl<Vll3WED LOCATTON 
1 AUDITORS' FEDERAL TERRITORY 
SABAH 
SARAWAK 
PENANG 
KEDAH 
2 ACADEMICS UKM 
u!A 
3 CCM KUALA LUMPUR 
4 MIA KUALA LUMPUR 
5 MSWG KUALA LUIVIPUR 
Results of  interview^^^ 
a) Auditors' Views 
The auditors responded that initially, the relationship between 
auditors and the company is contractual. However, the provisions of 
the Companies Act, BAFIA and the CMSA imposed various duties 
on auditors. Thus, auditors cannot be concerned of the company 
only. Hence, it is found that the relationship between auditors and a 
company is more than just mere contractual. 
The auditors also said that in fact it can be seen that since the 
involvement of CCM, SC, BNM and Bursa, the responsibilities of 
auditors are extended further. This cannot be avoided since the duties 
of auditors have to be enhanced. Fuetl~ermore, the fact that auditors' 
reporf is lodged with CCM shows that it is a public document 
Thus, auditors cannot claim that their relationship is only with the 
company. This is  especially in cases where it is a listed company. 
As far as a company is concerned, it only deals with auditors but as 
far as auditors are concerned, they have to bear in mind that there 
are others who have an interest in the outcome of auditors' report. 
However, if it is asmall company, the responsibilities ofauditors areto 
the shareholders ofthe company which is to prepare the auditors'report. 
43 For the purposes of canfrdentiality, the names of the mpondents cannot be 
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The auditors continued by arguing that the traditional relationship 
between the company and the auditors has changed. This is because 
in some situations there will be familiarity and friendship with 
the client. To a small extent this will affect the independence and 
objectivity ofthe auditors. Thus, auditors must ensure that the risk is 
insignificant and should not at any point of time neglect their duties 
just because of familiarity and friendship. 
Thus, the relationship betweenauditors and acompany is not merely 
contractual but more than contractual. However, the relationship 
should notbe toa close. Auditors must remain independent otlierwise 
it will be a threat to the profession. There must be a gap between 
auditors and a company. However, in terms of fraud and dishonesty, 
it can be said that the relationship is more than contractual. 
Since, auditors are knowledgeable and are trusted by various persons 
and bodies, it can be argued that auditors are under a fiduciary duty. 
Furthermore, there is a certain extent of personal elemeht in the 
audit process. This is because auditors must be distinguished from 
financial analysts. Auditors are considered as trustees and are not 
supposed to take any sides. Moreover, auditors must be independent. 
However, what is more important is to interpret the term fiduciary 
properly. But considering the amount of responsibilities attached to 
auditors in recent years, it can be avgued that auditors ate under a 
fiduciary duty. 
Some auditors found that it is not a valid argument to state that 
auditors are under afiduciary duty. Tlis is because one must look at 
the scope of engagement. It cannot be determined that auditors are 
under a fiduciary d4ty merely because various parties place reliance 
on auditors. 
b) Academics' Views 
The relationship between a company and its auditors is more than 
merely contractual. First, it has to be established as to whom the 
fiduciary duty is owed. It ltas to he naturally the company since it is 
the company which appointed tlie auditors. Thus, it can he argued 
that auditors are under a fiduciary duty. 
c) Regulators' Views 
The representative of the CCM stated that the relationship &tween 
auditors and a company is more than just mere contractual as 
proven in some case laws i.e. U36 Tenui@s v M m  Rothenberg a d  
C o m p u ~ , ~  where although auditors were never engaged to wnduct 
an audit for 11 36 Tenants Corporation, the auditors were found liable 
for failing to detect an embezzlement sclieme conducted by one of 
the client's managers. Thus, the role and duties expected of auditors 
placed them as a fiduciary as they are acting as watchdogs to protect 
the interest of members of the Gompany and to inform the regulators 
on my non-compliance issues or fraud by company's officers. 
d) Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group's Views 
The representative of the MSWe stated that auditors are appointed 
by shareholders. That is what the law requires and this is complicd 
with at the annual general meetings of the company. In practice, it is 
common knowledge that auditors are appointed by the directors. In 
principle, it is also open to shareholders to reject the directors'choice 
of auditors and to recommend their own appointment. However, in 
the real worid, they always accept the directors' recommendation. 
This attitude undeniably darnages auditors' independence. 
Irresponsible directors with utmost self-interest would tend to 
promote a rosy picture of the management's pwformance and their 
condud would have the most influence and power in the appointment 
and remuneration of auditors. 
Given the increased role and duties of auditors, directors should not 
be allowed any signifcant voice in the appointment of a cornparry's 
auditors. In this way, i t  is possible to avoid "the more than just mere 
contractud relationship between auditors and a company" as pointed 
out here. An audit does not involve the preparation and presentation 
of the financial information which is managemat's responsibility. 
It involves the independent examination and reporting on that 
information. Once auditors accept their appointment as auditors, a 
legal relationship is established with their client. There is clearly 
a role for independent, non-executive directors in audit committee 
to play their role and he effective as corporate watchdogs. It is 
also the auditorsQesponsibility to ensure that their relationship 
with the hoard of directors is a statutory function Their legal 
obligation is to report that directors present a true and fair view of 
the accounts. 
%ven the increased role and duties expected of auditors it is 
appropriate to place auditors as afiduciary. It is, however, recognized 
that the role of auditors is a statutoiy requirement in the public 
interest. Although auditors are in a position of frust, they perform 
a statutory duty and a legal obligation, different from directors who 
have a fiduciary ddury to act in the best interesk of the Company. 
Directors owe a fiduciary duty to their comppnies. Fiduciary duty 
is a duty owed by a director to his company in the fonn of two 
principles. He must not make secret profit and he must not allow any 
conflict to arise between his interest and his duty to the company. In 
any event, if a director made a secret profit and nobody knew about 
it, no one could raise an objection to it. However, auditors cannot be 
in such aposition as a director. A director is expected to act in good 
faith. It is incumbent for the Board of Directors to act collectively 
and individually when they discharge their duties. The business 
judgment rule in the law is what the courts ought to recognise and to 
refrain from second guessing whether or not t k  directors have been 
deemed to make decisions in good faith or otherwise. 
e) Malaysian Institute of Accountants' Views 
The representative of the MIA claimed that the relationship between 
auditors and a company is more than merely contractual since 
auditors will now have to consider the interests of all stakeholders 
as they rely on auditors' report. The representative is of the view 
that auditors are under a fiduciary duty considering the scope 
of their duties and obligations. Moreover, there is reliance by all 
the stakeliolders on auditors' report, The representative opined 
that it is definitely a non-audit services is a conflict of interest. 
In fact, in Europe, if a person does audit, he is not allowed to 
do non-audit. Thus, the same position should he adopted in 
Malaysia to further minimize the number of possible scaadals that 
involve auditors. 
Conclusion 
It is a trite fad that the relationship between a coinpany and its 
auditors is contractual. Nevertheless, the relationship is not merely 
contractual as auditors hold a public office. Furtherinore, auditors' 
report does not only belong to a company since it is lodged with 
CCM and thus it is a public document. The document is accessed 
by various parties wlio nay rely on the report since auditors are 
exteinal and independent person. Fusthennore, the parties who 
wish to rely on the report do not have rights and powers similar to 
auditors to exmine a company" hancial documents. Moreover, 
there is little significance to establish that there. is a contractual 
relationship between a company and its auditors since most ofthe 
time it is not the comnpmy which suffered a loss and wishes to bring 
an action against the auditors. It is the third parties who are at a 
loss. Observably, tlie views of the English and theMalaysian courts 
do show that auditors are under a fiducim duty which is owed to 
the company. Furthemore, the provisions of the Companies Act, 
BAFIA and the CMSA do show that auditors are under a fiduciary 
duty and the trend can be seen especially wid1 the incorporation of 
the duty of good faith on auditors. 
(Footnotes) 
1 A total nurnber of 22 auditors were interviewed. 

